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MANDAMUS PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
PUBLIC OFFICIALS: STATE OF NEW MEXICO
EX REL. BIRD v. APODACA
New Mexico Governor Jerry Apodaca attempted to temporarily
transfer the state highway engineer, James A. Bird, to the State Parks
and Recreation Commission. As a result of this attempt Bird brought
a mandamus proceeding before the New Mexico Supreme Court in
State of New Mexico ex reL Bird v. Apodaca1 to obtain an order
directing the Governor to "cease, desist and refrain from removing or
transferring" Bird or from interfering with Bird's activities as state
highway engineer. 2 In a close and ardently contested 3-2 decision the
court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus. This note analyzes the
holding's effect on mandamus proceedings against public officials in
New Mexico.' The discussion first considers whether the original
mandamus proceeding was properly brought before the supreme
court rather than the district court. An inquiry follows into whether
the issuance of a peremptory rather than alternative writ was proper.
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF THE
DISTRICT COURT AND SUPREME COURT
The requirements of and procedure for a writ of mandamus are set
out in New Mexico statutes.4 The writ "may be issued to any in-
ferior tribunal, corporation, board or person, to compel the perfor-
mance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust or station."' The New Mexico Constitution
provides that the "Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in
... mandamus against all state officers;" and, that "district courts
... shall have power to issue writs of ... mandamus."6 In addition,
the district courts are given "exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
of mandamus, except where such writ is to be directed to a district
court or a judge thereof in his official capacity, in which case the
Supreme Court has exclusive original jurisdiction."'  Since the
1. 91 N.M. 279, 573 P.2d 213 (1977).
2. Id. at 281, 573 P.2d at 215.
3. For an excellent and comprehensive survey of mandamus in New Mexico, see Dumars
& Browde, Mandamus in New Mexico, 4 N.M. L. Rev. 155 (1974).
4. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 44-2-1 to 14 (1978).
5. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 44-2-4 (1978).
6. N.M. Const. art. VI, § 13.
7. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 44-2-3 (1978).
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district and supreme courts have concurrent jurisdiction for man-
damus, when can mandamus be brought in the supreme court? The
supreme court is a court of review and prerogative writs should not
be used as substitutes for review.8 Supreme Court Rule 12 requires
that an original petition which could have been brought in the
district court set forth "the circumstances making it necessary or
proper to seek the writ in the Supreme Court."9 The usual standard
in New Mexico is "whether the particular case is of such public
importance to the state as to require original consideration by the
high court."' 0 The supreme court may also hear the petition if
"requiring an appeal would be so futile as to result in grave in-
justice."' ' The greatest dissension in Bird v. Apodaca concerned
whether or not the public importance to the state test was met.
Justice McManus, writing for the majority, devoted only one
sentence to public importance to the state: "[W] hen issues of suf-
ficient public importance are presented which involve a legal and not
a factual determination, we will not hesitate to accept the respon-
sibility of rendering a just and speedy disposition."' 2 Since it is not
explicitly stated in the opinion it must be assumed by implication
that the majority believed that depriving Bird of his power, but not
his salary,' 3 as state highway engineeer for at most three months 1
elevated Bird's petition to the heights of sufficient public impor-
tance. Justices Sosa and Payne, in separate dissenting opinions,
strongly disagreed. Acknowledging that extensive newspaper cover-
age of the dispute between Bird and Governor Apodaca indicated
"great public interest," Justice Payne observed that "[p]ublic
interest ... does not of itself rise to the status of public impor-
tance."' s Justice Sosa went even further and opined that the case
8. Baca v. Burks, 81 N.M. 376, 378, 467 P.2d 392, 394 (1970); State ex reL Owen v. Van
Stone, 17 N.M. 41, 44, 121 P. 611,612 (1912).
9. N.M. R. App. P. (Civ.) 12(a)(1) (1978).
10. Dumars & Browde, Mandamus in New Mexico, 4 N.M. L. Rev. 155,157 (1974) citing
to State ex rel. Chavez v. Evans, 79 N.M. 578, 446 P.2d 445 (1968); State ex reL Castillo
Corp. v. New Mexico State Tax Comm'n, 79 N.M. 357, 443 P.2d 850 (1968); State ex rel.
Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Worden, 44 N.M. 400, 103 P.2d 124 (1940).
11. Baca v. Burks, 81 N.M. 376, 378, 467 P.2d 392, 394 (1970).
12. State ex rel. Bird v. Apodaca, 91 N.M. 279, 282, 573 P.2d 213, 216 (1977). Refer-
ence is made to State ex reL Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975 (1974).
13. State ex rel. Bird v. Apodaca, 91 N.M. 279, 282, 573 P.2d 213, 216 (1977).
14. Bird would be deprived of his power as state highway engineer for at most three
months because the Highway Department Organization Act took effect on March 31, 1978.
This Act replaced the state highway engineer with a chief highway administrator whose
appointment must be consented to by the governor. Id. at 281,573 P.2d at 215.
15. Id. at 289, 573 P.2d at 223 (Payne, J., dissenting). Justice Sosa remarked that: "All
the attention placed on the squabble has not itself elevated it to the position of a legal battle
which is ripe for appellate review and one which requires our immediate attention in any
extraordinary manner." Id. at 286, 573 P.2d at 220.
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involved "a potential 'hot potato' within the executive branch,"' 6
and urged that "[w]e must never become embroiled in a political
fracas."' I The possibility that other bases for sufficient public
importance were considered by the majority can only be theorized.
One possibility is that any delay in the mandamus proceeding would
have very harmful effects on the Highway Department itself. No-
where were such arguments advanced by petitioner' ' and, even if
they were, they "could only be supported by factual considerations
not properly before this court."' 9 Justice Payne stated:
[A] t the time the petition was filed the conflict did not interfere
with the orderly conduct of business at the State Highway Depart-
ment so as to justify invoking the original jurisdiction of this Court.
The Department did not close its doors and the employees of the
Department continued to perform their normal duties in their usual
way. Even in the absence of the State Highway Engineer who has
undoubtedly been absent for vacations or other reasons, the Depart-
ment has functioned normally.2"
Although the majority does not so state, it also appears to apply
the secondary standard for supreme court consideration of the
petition. This secondary standard involves a determination that
"requiring an appeal would be so futile as to result in grave injus-
tice."'" Justice McManus states that "[t]he delays inherent in
proceeding in district court and a subsequent appellate review would
render the question moot before a final resolution could ever be
had." 2 2 Strong arguments against this rationale are presented by
Justice Payne. Not only could the district court have provided iden-
tical relief, but even if it had refused relief, there is the possibility
that "an appeal would possibly protract the litigation and delay an
ultimate resolution, but so it is in any case."' 3 There is always a
danger that a case will become moot before being reviewed and
"[t] his has never before had us stumbling over ourselves in order to
reach a quick decision." 2 4 Absent a showing that a delay would
prevent Bird from being remedied for any personal damage, pursuing
16. Id. at 288, 573 P.2d at 222 (Sosa, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 287, 573 P.2d at 221.
18. Id at 289, 573 P.2d at 223 (Payne, J., dissenting).
19. Id at 290, 573 P.2d at 224. The issues involved must involve legal and not factual
determinations. State ex reL Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 354 P.2d 975 (1974).
20. State ex rel. Bird v. Apodaca, 91 N.M. 279, 289, 573 P.2d 213, 223 (1977) (Payne,
J., dissenting).
21. Baca v. Burks, 81 N.M. 376, 378, 467 P.2d 392, 394 (1970).
22. State ex rel. Bird v. Apodaca, 91 N.M. 279, 282, 573 P.2d 213, 216 (1977).
23. Id. at 289, 573 P.2d at 223 (Payne, J., dissenting).
24. Id at 287, 573 P.2d at 221 (Sosa, J., dissenting).
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mandamus in the district court was a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy.2 5 Since Bird's transfer to the Parks and Recreation Commis-
sion would not affect either his salary or his tenure, it is difficult to
imply grave injustice.2 6
The inescapable conclusion is that either the mandamus pro-
ceeding was improvidently allowed to be brought before the supreme
court or that the "public importance to the state" test and the
"grave injustice" test have been so depreciated as to become mean-
ingless. Can petitioners who show that they would lose the enjoy-
ment of some authority or power, even though no pecuniary loss was
suffered, now use Bird v. Apodaca as precedent to obtain supreme
court attention if they can also show that possible mootness would
result should they pursue the ordinary procedure of first going to the
district court? Perhaps an additional requirement would be that a
dispute of great public interest is involved. Surely this is not the
intent of Supreme Court Rule 12 or of the well established policy of
judicial restraint. "[0] ur system of appellate review requires litigants
to develop their case fully in lower courts thereby bringing out all
the facts and legal issues which allow us to take a judicious look at
what has occurred below. Now, the majority has seen fit to dispense
with judicial restraint." 2 7
PEREMPTORY V. ALTERNATIVE WRIT OF MANDAMUS
A writ of mandamus can be either alternative or peremptory.2
"The alternative writ shall ... command [respondent to] . . . do the
act required to be performed, or show cause before the court...
why he has not done So. ' ' 2 9 "When the right to require the perfor-
mance of the act is clear, and it is apparent that no valid excuse can
be given for not performing it, a peremptory mandamus may be
allowed in the first instance; in all other cases the alternative writ
shall be first issued." ' 0
The alternative writ is the usual writ sought since the peremptory
writ is issued ex parte and grants final relief without any prior notice
or opportunity to be heard. Although the New Mexico Supreme
Court held in an early case that issuance of a peremptory writ did
not contravene due process of law, more recent cases expanding the
concept of due process have so undercut that earlier ruling as to
25. Id. at 289, 573 P.2d at 223 (Payne, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 282, 573 P.2d at 216.
27. Id. at 286, 573 P.2d at 220 (Sosa, J., dissenting).
28. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 44-2-6 (1978).
29. Id.
30. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 44-2-7 (1978).
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render use of the peremptory writ constitutionally suspect and
inadvisable.
3 1
Although Bird was allowed to orally argue before the court, the
issuance of a peremptory writ precluded the Governor from pre-
senting his arguments. 3 2 Since a New Mexico statute on its face gives
the Governor authorization to transfer state employees,
3  it is not
"clear" or "apparent" that he cannot transfer Bird. 3 ' The Governor,
therefore, should have been given the opportunity to orally argue
against mandamus. Justice Payne adds that in order to determine
whether or not there are "factual disputes which need resolution"
before the court exercises jurisdiction, the oral arguments and briefs
of both parties should be analyzed. 3 1 "We should only act in such
cases when there are no factual differences to interfere with the legal
issues involved. We have no such assurance in this case."
3 6 An
alternative writ, therefore, should have been issued.
CONCLUSION
Bird v. Apodaca reflects a policy expansion by the New Mexico
Supreme Court concerning when it will originally consider man-
damus petitions. The established "public interest to the state" test
and the "grave injustice" test were abandoned in Bird for a more
liberal yet poorly enunciated standard. Mandamus petitioners who
can show that they would lose the enjoyment of some authority or
power can use Bird as precedent to obtain supreme court attention if
they can also show that possible mootness would result should they
pursue the ordinary procedure of going first to the district court.
Perhaps a dispute of great public interest is also required. This
31. Dumars & Browde, Mandamus in New Mexico, 4 N.M. L. Rev. 155,161-62 (1974).
The early New Mexico Supreme Court case which held that a peremptory writ did not
contravene due process of law was Board of County Commissioners v. Fourth Judicial
District, 29 N.M. 244, 259, 223 P. 516, 520 (1924). The more recent cases tending to
broaden due process protection include Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Montoya v. Blackhurst, 84 N.M. 91, 500 P.2d 176 (1972).
32. State ex rel. Bird v. Apodaca, 91 N.M. 279, 288, 573 P.2d 213, 222 (1977) (Sosa, J.,
dissenting); id at 289, 573 P.2d at 223 (Payne, J., dissenting).
33. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 10-7-1 (1978) states:
The governor is further authorized, subject to the approval of the state board
of finance, to transfer, temporarily from one office, department or institution
to another office, department or institution, such employees as in his judg-
ment may be necessary or convenient at any time to further the economical
and efficient conduct of the state government and without regard to the
appropriation out of which such employee may be paid. ...
34. State ex rel. Bird v. Apodaca, 91 N.M. 279, 288, 573 P.2d 213, 222 (1977) (Sosa, J.,
dissenting).
35. Id. at 289, 573 P.2d at 223.
36. Id
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unnecessary policy expansion is repugnant to the doctrine of judicial
restraint.
By issuing a peremptory rather than alternative writ of mandamus,
the supreme court precluded Governor Apodaca from presenting oral
arguments although it heard petitioner's arguments. In light of recent
United States Supreme Court decisions which have expanded dueprocess requirements,3 the New Mexico Supreme Court shoud not
have issued a peremptory writ.
-ROBERT WAYNE MYERS
37. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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